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Hurricane Sandy, the largest, most deadly,
and second costliest Atlantic storm
recorded in history, hit New York City the
night of October 29, 2012 (1). The lights
blacked out and a silence fell across the
usually bustling streets of downtown Man-
hattan. Sandy had resulted in widespread
flooding of the streets, major tunnels, and
subway systems in lower Manhattan and
left some 2.5 million residents in New Jer-
sey and 2.3 million residents in New York
without electricity (2). Flooding and gen-
erator failures led to the unprecedented
evacuation and closure of all hospitals in
the lower half of Manhattan except for
Beth Israel Medical Center (3). As patients
and ambulances arrived at the already busy
emergency department (ED), Beth Israel
was forced to face a new and unexpected
challenge.
Beth Israel Medical Center is an urban
teaching hospital with a 110K+ annual
ED census with over 90 ED beds and a
pre-hurricane daily inpatient census of 650
patients. As the only hospital left provid-
ing medical care in lower Manhattan, the
ED census increased by 20% and ambu-
lance arrivals spiked by 64% in the first
4 weeks. ED visits increased from a baseline
of just under 300 daily to as many as 500
patients in the initial week of the disaster.
The inpatient census increased to 750, with
the hospital operating at full capacity. In
an attempt to accommodate the increased
volume, a third ED area was opened 24/7, a
nearby rehab center was utilized as a venue
for low-risk medical patients and beds
were added to some two-person and three-
person inpatient rooms, expanding total
capacity by approximately 5%. However,
in addition to total capacity increasing
5%, beds on the detox floors were con-
verted to medicine beds, increasing med-
ical admission capacity further. However,
this was still not enough to accommo-
date the increase in volume, and lines
formed out the door, resulting in a three-
fold increase (15%) of ambulance patients
“left without being seen” (4). This larger-
than-expected increase may be a cause of
not only the increased waiting time but also
the increased chaos and sense of frustration
that was felt post-Hurricane. It may also
reflect that a large portion of increased vol-
ume came from low-acuity patients, as one
of the closest closed ED’s, at Bellevue Hos-
pital, has a very low-acuity population with
just an approximate 10% admission rate.
There was a large increase in the demand
for social services as patients could not
return to their flooded, waterless, and
powerless homes, which was met by an
immediate increased in social work pres-
ence. Social workers typically would see
8–10 patients/day, which spiked to approx-
imately 200 in the first 3 days after the
hurricane. Inpatient social work facilitated
rapid discharge plans to make room for
new patients. They helped to set up a
building across the street as shelter and
directed patients to other nearby shelters,
and arranged transfers to assisted care facil-
ities. This was helpful in reducing some
of the crowding in the ED by mobilizing
discharged patients.
The inpatient medicine floor was over-
whelmed, resulting in long wait times for
inpatient beds and boarding of patients
in the ED for days. Medicine attending
physicians visited admitted patients in the
ED, and assisted with daily management.
In a partially successful effort to allevi-
ate ED overcrowding, representatives of
renal, endocrine, and cardiology services
also made “rounds” in the ED in an effort
to avoid admissions for select patients who
may safely be managed as outpatients. For
example, some patients that would have
been admitted for a cardiac work-up were
immediately scheduled for next-day stress
tests. There were also plans to admit non-
surgical abdominal complaints to the sur-
gical service although execution of these
plans was not successful.
There was an early spike in the volume
of oxygen-dependent patients, hemodial-
ysis patients, and medication refills, with
a total 33% increase from baseline. To
streamline these HD patients, nephrolo-
gists came down to the ED and each patient
immediately had a potassium level mea-
sured and quickly assessed for a need of
emergent dialysis and admitted or trans-
ferred to a nearby facility. The Army Corps
of Engineers brought generators to help the
hospital and a nearby dialysis center was
up and running within 3 days. With phar-
macies closed, patients could not get pre-
scriptions filled. The inpatient pharmacy
began filling prescriptions for up to 5 days
but quickly became overwhelmed and ran
low on stock. Patients sometimes waited in
the ED for hours to have their prescriptions
filled.
Perhaps the most successful response
was the increase in ED physician staffing
by not only hospital staff but also by
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importing physicians from a nearby closed
hospital. Native attending physicians pro-
vided an additional 197 h in the first week,
an average 9 h additional per full time
attending per week, with many working
an additional 25 h/week. This resulted in
two additional attendings during a week-
day shift and three additional attendings
during a weekend shift. With expedited
credentialing, visiting physicians covered
63 h of these hours by week 3, somewhat
reducing the burden. Similarly, native res-
idents already in the ED worked extra
shifts and those on off-service rotations
were immediately pulled back to the ED,
providing an additional 324 h of cover-
age, with each resident on average work-
ing an extra 12 h and residents pulled in
from off-service rotations providing 48 h in
the first week. Imported residents provided
an additional 126 h/week by week 3. The
imported providers stayed for 2 months,
until mid-January. This was critical not
only for Beth Israel hospital but also for the
imported residents, who needed the clini-
cal hours to meet national requirements to
graduate (5). However, we found that vis-
iting clinicians were less productive than
home clinicians, by 10–30%, a known chal-
lenge of using visiting clinicians during
emergencies (5).
Beth Israel has a 12-member Disas-
ter Management Committee co-chaired
by one physician and one non-physician
leader. The former is the Vice Chair of
the ED, and the latter carries a Masters
in Public Health and had worked previ-
ously in EMS for the Fire Department
of New York. The Disaster Management
Committee also included hospital leader-
ship, and would organize disaster manage-
ment and run practice drills using standard
command structure.
Hurricane Sandy was an extraordinary
urban emergency challenge and Beth Israel
was able to meet many unexpected obsta-
cles applying creative and rapid solu-
tions, reallocating resources, and providing
a multifaceted response that was largely
successful. However, there are still many
opportunities for improvement, particu-
larly in the area of pre-planning. With the
invaluable lessons learned from this expe-
rience, Beth Israel Medical Center and New
York City are already more prepared for
their next disaster.
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